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Abstract A definition of causation as probability-raising is threatened by two
kinds of counterexample: first, when a cause lowers the probability of its effect; and
second, when the probability of an effect is raised by a non-cause. In this paper,
I present an account that deals successfully with problem cases of both these kinds.
In doing so, I also explore some novel implications of incorporating into the
metaphysical investigation considerations of causal psychology.
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1 Introduction
The central idea of probabilistic causation is that a cause is something that increases
the probability of its effect. It is clear immediately that two kinds of counterexample
are possible, threatening respectively this criterion’s necessity and sufficiency: first,
when a cause lowers the probability of its effect; and second, when the probability
of an effect is raised by a non-cause. In this paper, I present an account that deals
successfully with problem cases of both these kinds.
The account has a peculiar feature though, namely that according to it something
is deemed a cause not because it raises the probability of its effect there and then, as
is usually proposed, but rather only because it raises the probability of its effect later
in time. However, although this formal condition is indeed peculiar metaphysically,
I shall argue that it has a very natural interpretation psychologically—as a symptom
of the fact that, at least with regard to causal judgment, we humans are committed
determinists. This leaves us with an interpretive choice. Either, first, the formalism
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to be developed below can be read as a straightforwardly metaphysical account of
probabilistic causation. Or else, second, it can be read instead as a theory of our
causal judgment rather than of causation itself.
The formal analysis of the core problem cases stands on its own merits, and is
compatible with either option. Nevertheless, I shall frame the discussion with the
second interpretation in mind. In the final section, I explain why—the reason is that
even on a psychologistic reading the account still turns out to have metaphysical
implications; and, further, those implications are now of a more desirable kind. In
particular, I shall argue that probability-raising at a later time, when understood as a
theory of causal judgment, actually provides support for the more traditional
metaphysical view of causation as probability-raising there and then. That in turn is
desirable for reasons beyond mere lack of peculiarity. For example, it thereby saves
from counterexample the view of causation already central to the contemporary
causal modeling literature, causal decision theory, and scientific practice generally.
The psychological detour thus pays metaphysical dividends. The exact argument for
how it does so is methodologically novel. But to prepare the ground for all that, first
it will be necessary to develop and apply the formal account in detail.
2 Ex ante versus ex post
Begin by considering token cases. On the standard view, probability is to be
understood in them as objective single-case chance and the probability-raising
criterion becomes a species of token counterfactual account—a cause is something
that increases the chance of its effect compared to what that chance would have been
had the cause been absent.1 I shall assume, in common with most of the relevant
literature, that the causal relata are events. Nothing important hangs on this though, as
analogous eventual conclusions could still be drawn even given other choices of relata
such as facts or aspects. In all our examples, c and e will denote actual events, c
occurring before e, and we shall be concerned with the objective chance of e occurring.
Now turn to what will prove a key distinction—that between what I shall label ex
ante and ex post probability. I shall take ‘ex ante’ to refer to the time when c occurs
or, in those counterfactual cases where c does not occur, to the time in the nearest
*c-world corresponding to when c occurs in the actual one (where ‘*c’ denotes
not-c). I shall take ‘ex post’, on the other hand, to refer to the time when e occurs or,
in those counterfactual cases where c does not occur, to the time in the nearest
*c-world corresponding to when e occurs in the actual one.2 It follows that the
1 For example Lewis (1986). I omit discussion of exactly how to understand single-case objective
probabilities on the grounds that, with regard to the issues discussed in this paper, that is not the salient
locus of philosophical dispute. I discuss the relevant counterfactuals at greater length in due course.
Finally, for more on interpreting ‘absent’, see footnote 6 below.
2 If c is a hastener or delayer, then the counterpart of e in the nearest *c-world will occur at a slightly
different time to e in the actual world. In those cases, each ex post probability should be evaluated at the
time e occurs in its own world. In particular, ppostc eð Þ and ppost c eð Þ will therefore be evaluated at slightly
different times. (I do not address here the vexed issue of how best to individuate events, and thus of just
when a change in the timing of e is so great as to mean that the e in the nearest *c-world should be
counted a different event altogether, and thus ppost c eð Þ be declared zero.)
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chance of e evaluated ex post is trivially always either 0 or 1, depending solely on
whether e also occurs. (This follows immediately from, for instance, Lewis’s
definition of chance.) Thus the ex post chance of e is really a ‘probability’ at all only
in a trivial formal sense, and might equally be thought of instead merely as a binary
marker of whether e occurs. Moreover, it is trivially 0 or 1 both in the actual world
where c does occur and also in the nearest world in which c does not, although how
the latter chance is perceived by us is a more complicated matter, as we shall see.
Let pc(e) denote the chance of e occurring in the actual world, and p*c(e) denote
the chance of e occurring in the nearest *c-world. Then the criterion for c being a
probabilistic cause of e may be written: pc(e) - p*c(e) [ 0. In words, c is a cause
of e iff it makes e more likely, i.e. iff pc(e) is bigger than p*c(e).
In almost the entire literature these probabilities have been understood to be, in
our terminology, ex ante. That is, attention has always focused on the chance of e,
evaluated at the time c occurs. Here, I propose that we should instead frame the
criterion in terms of probabilities understood to be ex post.3 Label the ex ante
probabilities pantec eð Þ and pante c eð Þ, and the ex post ones ppostc eð Þ and ppost c eð Þ. Then,
for c and e distinct actual events, c occurring before e, the proposed new criterion is:
c cause e iff ppostc eð Þ  ppost c eð Þ ½EP
That is, I propose that the relevant inequality should be with respect to ex post,
rather than ex ante, probability.4 Intuitively, the idea is that in probabilistic cases we
judge only in hindsight, deeming something a cause depending on whether its
chancy effect actually did subsequently occur (and also on whether its chancy effect
would have occurred in nearby possible worlds).
3 Note that this criterion is not a final analysis of causation. For one thing, as we shall see (Sect. 7), it
seems that the relevant counterfactuals cannot be evaluated reductively. For another, this paper does not
address another important class of problem cases, namely those of overdetermination (although Sect. 9
will mention one strategy for doing so).
4 This proposal is entirely different from that advocated by Kvart (2004), notwithstanding the superficial
resemblance between Kvart’s notion of ‘ex post facto’ causation and mine of ex post probability. Kvart’s
ingenious idea is designed to yield the probability-raising result even for the ex ante probabilities, by
stipulating that they be conditionalized on possible intermediate events between cause and effect. These
intermediate events could raise or lower the ex ante probability. An ex post probability of our kind, on the
other hand, in effect conditionalizes only on actual intermediate events (or, in counterfactual instances,
only on those intermediate events occurring in the nearest *c-world). More particularly, it makes no
necessary reference to intermediate events. As a result it can be applied even to cases without such events,
and thus avoids counterexamples to Kvart associated with his scheme’s need to invoke them (e.g. Dowe
2004, pp. 33–34). Moreover, our approach has no ambition to define (token) causation in terms of ex ante
probability.
The proposed criterion is also distinct from Eells’s (1991) interesting account of token causation in
terms of probability trajectories. Among other differences, our criterion takes no account of how the
chance of e evolves between c and e, but rather only considers its final value at the time of e.
The closest predecessor in the literature is a suggestion due to Ned Hall, as reported by Christopher
Hitchcock (2004, p. 414). Hall suggests that we evaluate the probability of an effect ‘shortly before the
time at which the effect occurs.’ Hitchcock also outlines a related proposal of his own, offered, like
Hall’s, as a solution to the Two Bullets case (Example Three below). But as Hitchcock goes on to explain,
both these proposals suffer from having to assume certain probabilistic details about the particular Two
Bullets case, plus also from having to assume that certain ex ante probabilities can take values of 0 and 1
(thus committing themselves a priori to denying that the universe is indeterministic ‘all the way down’).
This paper’s account, by evaluating the probability at the time of e itself, avoids both these defects.
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Given our definition of ex post probability, [EP] is equivalent to a simple
counterfactual account—for actual events c and e, c is a cause of e iff O(*c) entails
O(*e).5 As will become apparent, I have framed the account in terms of ex post
probability in order to elucidate its applicability to probabilistic cases, and also to
emphasize what turns out to be a highly salient distinction—that between causal
judgment and the metaphysics of causation itself.
The new criterion [EP] is easiest to appreciate by means of example. Start with a
case that is relatively simple and uncontroversial.
Example One: Indeterministic Bomb. An unstable atom is placed in a box wired
up such that if the atom decays then a bomb will be triggered. There is no other way
for the bomb to be triggered, so it explodes if and only if the atom decays. Suppose
that the device is due to be disconnected after one day, and that the atom has a 0.5
chance of decaying in this period. Suppose finally that, in fact, the atom does decay
and so the bomb does indeed explode.
Let c = the event of placing the atom in the apparatus, *c=not doing so,6 and
e = the bomb’s explosion. A comparison of the ex ante probabilities yields:
pantec eð Þ  pante c e½  ¼ 0:5  0 ¼ 0:5 [ 0:
Thus c increases e’s ex ante probability, so on the standard view c is endorsed as e’s
cause, and all seems well.
What of our new approach here? First, since it was stipulated that the bomb did in
fact explode, we know immediately that ppostc eð Þ ¼ 1: What of ppost c eð Þ? Here we must
evaluate an ‘ex post counterfactual.’ The obvious evaluation in this case is: ppost c eð Þ ¼ 0:
The reasoning is that, on the supposition that*c transpired, by assumption there was
no chance then that e also transpired. (More on ex post counterfactuals later.)
So criterion [EP] yields a calculation of:
ppostc eð Þ  ppost c eð Þ ¼ 1  0 ¼ 1 [ 0:
Thus [EP] too endorses c as a cause of e.
Although both approaches alike therefore endorse c as a cause, arguably even in this
simple case the traditional approach is a little troublesome. It yields a quantitative
answer: pantec eð Þ  pante c eð Þ ¼ 0:5; so c is deemed a cause of e ‘to degree 0.5’.7 At first
glance, this might seem appropriate. But, in fact, do we judge c a cause only ‘to degree
0.5’? On the contrary, if the bomb does explode then it seems we more naturally judge
c just to be the cause of that simpliciter, with equal intuitive strength as if the triggering
had been entirely determinate—which is just the result that [EP] gives.
5 Modulo complications concerning ex post counterfactuals, on which see more later.
6 I intend ‘*c’, here and elsewhere, as convenient shorthand for specific contrast events, as dictated by
context. I intend no commitment to the notion of negative events. Sometimes, exactly which contrast
event ‘*c’ denotes may be unclear. I omit discussion of what to do in those cases because in all examples
in this paper, save that discussed explicitly in Sect. 8.1, again the salient locus of philosophical dispute
lies elsewhere.
7 This assumes that a probability-raising criterion such as [EP] is capable of being interpreted
quantitatively at all. If pc(e) - p*c(e) = 0.7, say, I want to say that this equates to our judgment thinking
c ‘probably’ a cause of e. Strictly, therefore, our judgment is being deemed sensitive to the extent to
which pc(e) - p*c(e) [ 0. In the ex post case, even this will always be 0 or 1.
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Of course, notwithstanding its quantitative formula, the standard approach is not
committed to analyzing degree of causation. However, although it would take us
beyond the scope of this paper to do so, one could argue that there should be
continuity between qualitative and quantitative analyses so that not only is a non-
zero probability difference necessary for causation, but also the greater that
difference the greater the degree of causation. And in so far as causal intuition,
slippery enough even in qualitative terms, can also be tracked quantitatively, it then
seems that here an ex post approach does it better.
3 A psychological interpretation
As mentioned, ppostc eð Þ always takes the value 1 or 0, depending only on whether e
actually did occur or not. ppost c eð Þ; i.e. the counterfactual, will be 1 or 0 too, modulo
complications to be discussed later. It follows that formula [EP], i.e. ppostc eð Þ
ppost c eð Þ; will yield integer scores of 1, 0 or -1. In words, and adopting a
psychologistic interpretation of [EP], our judgments of causation in singular cases
are typically not a matter of degree; rather, they are all or nothing. If [EP] is correct,
that is, we deem something either to be a full cause (or hindrance) or else not a
cause at all. No scope is left for probabilistic nuance or qualification.
Why do we adopt this attitude? The obvious psychological explanation is that, at
least where causation is concerned, we are natural determinists.8 In particular, a
commitment to determinism implies we think that, in reality, once c occurs the
(objective) probability of e is already either 0 or 1. Accordingly, our causal
judgments track the ex post formulation of [EP], which in return can thus be seen as
a way of operationalizing a determinist attitude. True enough, [EP] in itself implies
only that we wait until sure of an outcome before attributing causation, and that is
not yet equivalent to belief in determinism. Perhaps there are other persuasive
motivations for so waiting. But it is hard to imagine why we should be so resistant to
probabilistic causal attributions—except as a by-product of a belief in determinism.
Notice also that our account is committed to ‘counterfactual definiteness’—
namely that if c had not occurred, then there is a fact of the matter as to whether e
would or would not have. This corresponds to a Stalnaker-style rather than Lewis-
style semantics. Indeed, strictly speaking, the psychological determinism described
above really boils down just to this counterfactual definiteness.9
According to [EP], whether c is a cause of e is determined only later in time, after
c itself has occurred. This kind of temporal extrinsicness is contrary to the standard
ex ante view. Given determinism, it is also rather peculiar metaphysically—for on a
deterministic view, it should be determinate from the moment c occurs whether or
not e will also occur. Yet while peculiar metaphysically, such extrinsicness is less so
psychologically. Perhaps the situation in the eyes of our causal judgment might be
8 I have in mind a Laplacean view of determinism, according to which the instantaneous state of the
world at any time uniquely determines the state at any other time. I will not defend this exact formulation
here as, again, the salient locus of philosophical dispute lies elsewhere.
9 I thank an anonymous referee for emphasizing the points in this paragraph.
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described more perspicuously by saying that whether c is a cause is sometimes only
revealed to us after the fact. In our judgment’s eyes, in actuality c was already a full
cause or not all along (because of determinism), it is just that sometimes we require
the subsequent unfolding of events before we can settle our own uncertainty
concerning the matter. It is true that on occasion we may feel sure of e even before it
occurs—but not always. In the general case, therefore, only the ex post formulation
tracks our judgment reliably.
Historically, the link between determinism and causation is of course familiar,
indeed the latter notion was for a long period almost a synonym for the former. Two
problems for causal determinism have motivated the appeal in more recent times to
a probabilistic view, but neither problem tells against this paper’s approach.
First, according to many at least, modern science suggests strongly that the world
itself is not deterministic. But nothing here denies the existence of irreducibly
indeterministic physical processes. Indeed, Example One was a case that assumed
such processes and yet nevertheless was easily analyzed by our scheme. The claim
is not that the physical universe itself is deterministic, rather only that our causal
judgment assumes that it is. Plausibly, perhaps the human brain, when faced with
apparent indeterminacy, always explains that as being due merely to ignorance of
the underlying deterministic processes, in turn maybe because in everyday life this
tactic so often turns out to be productive.10 The brain may or may not be right to
adopt this blanket metaphysical attitude—that is a matter for science. The claim
here is merely that it does. (See Sect. 9 for more on the psychological evidence.)
The second problem has been the centrality—indeed seeming indispensability—
of probabilistic causation to scientific practice. For example, ‘smoking causes
cancer’ is presumably a valuable scientific discovery, yet the causal claim is
obviously probabilistic since smoking does not make cancer certain but rather only
more likely. Moreover, this time the problem also threatens to infect the
psychological interpretation, because it seems that often our causal judgments are
correspondingly probabilistic too. For instance, we easily judge that a particular
cancer was ‘probably’ caused by smoking. I shall explain later though (Sect. 6) how
such probabilistic judgments are still compatible with this paper’s underlying
psychological picture of us as determinists.
We require one more piece of preliminary work. Although a determinist takes the
ex post counterfactual ppost c eð Þ always to have a value of either 0 or 1, often, it being
counterfactual, we may never know which. Our causal judgment is then forced to
appeal instead to its best guess as to whether e would occur or not. But given that we
are determinists, the uncertainty here is perceived to be merely epistemic. As a
result, the ‘best’ guess is ppost c eð Þ’s expected value, conditionalized on our
information set restricted to the actual world. What, in turn, is the best guess
about this epistemic probability? The answer will depend on the details of the case.
Often, it will simply be equal to pantec eð Þ; i.e. to the ex ante value. (See Sect. 6 for
10 Sometimes I hit a golf ball straight, sometimes crooked. But rather than attribute the outcomes each
time to indeterminism, instead I assume always that some aspect of my technique was the (determining)
cause. And that assumption is surely not only sensible but also productive, as only in this way am I
motivated to search for these causes and thereby to improve.
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more on this connection between epistemic and ex ante probability.) But other
times, a particular causal model may license a different answer.11
For example, let c = John smokes, and e = John develops lung cancer. How should
we evaluate ppost c eð Þ; i.e. the ex post counterfactual ‘if John had not smoked, he would
have developed lung cancer’? Suppose that 5% of non-smokers develop lung cancer,
while 20% of smokers do. Then the relevant ex ante counterfactual, i.e. pantec eð Þ; is
0.05—but this may be the wrong evaluation of the ex post counterfactual ppost c eð Þ: For
suppose that there are three kinds of people: type A are very susceptible and get lung
cancer regardless of whether or not they smoke; type B are moderately susceptible and
get lung cancer if and only if they smoke; and type C will not get lung cancer regardless
of whether they smoke. We can infer that 5% of the population are of type A, and 15%
of type B. Conditionalized on the actual-world information set that he smoked and
developed lung cancer, we can in turn infer that John was either of type A or of type B,
but we have no evidence which. Accordingly, the best guess as to ppost c eð Þ is our best
guess that John was of type A, i.e. 0.25 (i.e. 5%/20%)—and not the ex ante probability
0.05. Other underlying models of lung cancer could generate different answers again.
The claim here is regarding our psychology—that in epistemically imperfect
circumstances our causal judgment does not evaluate ppost c eð Þ to be the disjunction 0
or 1, but rather to be a probabilistic best guess.12 On the psychologistic interpretation,
when applying [EP] we must allow in this way for how our judgment incorporates
epistemic considerations into its evaluation of ppost c eð Þ:13
We are now finally ready to turn to [EP]’s chief attraction, namely that it delivers the
correct results in key otherwise problematic cases, where ‘correct’ is read as tracking our
causal judgments successfully. There are a plethora of such cases. In this paper I shall
consider only a representative few, but analogous solutions apply to others as well.
4 Chance-lowering causes
Example Two: Golf Ball (due originally to Deborah Rosen and much discussed
since). A golfer slices her chip shot way to the right, but by good fortune her ball
hits a tree and deflects directly into the hole. For c = the golfer slices the ball, and
e = the ball goes into the hole, we want to say that c does cause e, via the
11 Again, I thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to me, and for the lung cancer example that
follows.
12 This accords with standard decision theory. When planning for the future we rely on our knowledge of
what our present actions will cause, and we calculate that in turn via the epistemic probabilities of those
actions’ effects—even if we think the world is ultimately deterministic.
This also facilitates the continuity mentioned earlier between qualitative and quantitative analyses of
causation. In particular, according to [EP] c is deemed a full (zero) cause of e iff ppost c eð Þ equals 0 (1); for
all intermediate values of ppost c eð Þ; c is a ‘partial’ cause. But in order to generate and order these
intermediate cases, we need to allow our judgment to evaluate ppost c eð Þ probabilistically.
13 We therefore need to amend the interpretation of the left-hand probability in [EP] as well. In particular,
if the right-hand probability is epistemic then, for the sake of the formula’s coherence, so should be the left-
hand one too. As a result, in [EP] ppostc eð Þ should be interpreted as our judgment’s best guess regarding the
objective ex post probability, rather than the ex post probability itself. But since, by assumption, whether e
occurs is known, the two interpretations yield the same value anyway so this is not a problem.
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intermediate event of deflecting off the tree.14 The problem is that, on the standard
ex ante view, this implies a chance-lowering cause:
pantec eð Þ ¼ 0:001; say, given that almost all sliced chips end up in the bushes.
pante c eð Þ ¼ 0:05; say, given that a non-sliced chip hit squarely would be much
more likely to end near the hole.
so pantec eð Þ  pante c eð Þ\0:
But now we see:
ppostc eð Þ ¼ 1; given that the sliced ball did in fact deflect into the hole.
ppost c eð Þ : our judgment has insufficient information to evaluate this ex post
counterfactual precisely. As discussed above, in such circumstances it must
therefore appeal instead merely to its best guess. Here, this will likely be the ex
ante probability, which, by assumption, is 0.05.15
so ppostc eð Þ  ppost c eð Þ ¼ 1  0:05 ¼ almost 1:
Thus, by going ex post, c is now endorsed as (almost certainly) a cause of e, as
desired. (More on this example later.)
5 Chance-raising non-causes
Hitchcock (2004) and Schaffer (2000) both rightly emphasize the importance of
problem cases ‘the other way round’, i.e. of chance-raising by apparent non-causes.
Here is one that Hitchcock himself selects (2004, p. 410) as being especially intractable.
Example Three: Two Bullets (due originally to James Woodward). Two gunmen
fire simultaneously at a vase. Each gunman’s bullet has an independent probability
0.5 of hitting (and hence shattering) it. Suppose that, in fact, the first bullet does
indeed hit the vase, but that the second one flies wide.
For c = the firing of the second bullet, and e = the shattering of the vase, we want
to say that c does not cause e because the second bullet flew wide. The problem for
the standard ex ante view is that this implies that a non-cause is chance-raising:
14 Or so at least our judgment is traditionally deemed to go here. For those who do not share it, one of the
many other framing narratives in the literature may be substituted. What matters for our purposes is only
the basic structure of the case, namely that a token effect occurs in an unusual way, leading to a mismatch
between attribution of token causation and increase in ex ante probability. (Remember that we are
concerned only with physical causal responsibility, not with moral or explanatory responsibility.)
15 As noted in the previous section, the best guess is not necessarily the ex ante probability. It depends on
what causal structure we believe to be present, something not fully captured by the quoted probabilities.
What matters for our purposes, in both this and other examples, is whichever evaluation of ppost c eð Þ is
actually driving our causal judgment, since it is that judgment that ultimately we are seeking to account
for. Here, our judgment seems informed by the assumption that not slicing the ball (rather than slicing it)
would yield a greater chance of the ball going in the hole, and any evaluation satisfying that qualitative
constraint leads to [EP] delivering the desired verdict. (The ex ante probability is only one such
evaluation.) More outre´ possibilities, wherein not slicing the ball would not have altered the chances of
the ball going into the hole, do not seem to be informing our judgment here. But if they were, so that
whether we sliced the ball made no difference, arguably we would no longer judge slicing the ball to be a
cause of it going in the hole—and [EP] would in turn now reflect that. (In Sect. 8.3, I analyze an example
in which [EP] tracks in this way how our judgment varies with background causal assumptions.)
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pantec eð Þ ¼ 0:75; pante c eð Þ ¼ 0:5; so pantec eð Þ  pante c eð Þ[ 0:
But now analyze in terms of ex post probabilities: first, clearly ppostc eð Þ ¼ 1:
Given that the first bullet is stipulated to hit the vase independently of the second
bullet, we also know that the ex post counterfactual ppost c eð Þ ¼ 1 too. Intuitively,
whether the second bullet was fired made no difference to the fate of the first bullet.
(I discuss the evaluation of such ex post counterfactuals in more detail in Sect. 7.)
So ppostc eð Þ ¼ ppost c eð Þ; which is exactly what we want when c is a non-cause. Thus
the ex post approach again tracks our causal judgment accurately.
Moreover, recapitulating a point from Sect. 2, consider d = the firing of the first
bullet. It is readily seen that (in obvious notation):
Ex ante: panted eð Þ  pante d eð Þ ¼ 0:75  0:5 ¼ 0:25:
Ex post: p
post
d eð Þ  ppost d eð Þ ¼ 1  0 ¼ 1:
Both approaches yield that d is a cause of e, as desired. But only by going ex post is
the first bullet given full causal credit for the shattering of the vase, which I think
matches our judgment here much better than a credit merely ‘to degree 0.25’.
6 Type and epistemic probabilities
There is an obvious intimate connection between ex ante probability and type
probability. Recall the indeterministic bomb from Example One: the atom decays,
thereby triggering the bomb, with probability 0.5. In a population of such bombs,
the type probability of a bomb exploding is clearly equal to the ex ante probability
of 0.5 (assuming that each device is independent).
As is well known, the type/ex ante probability is in turn central for prediction and
other instrumental purposes. For example, the total number of expected explosions
would be 0.5 times the number of devices. Often it is the type probability that is
deemed relevant to our assignment of moral or legal responsibility, just because it
exactly captures what could reasonably have been expected.16 Moreover, often it is
the type probability that is relevant to the practice of science. For example, the claim
‘smoking causes cancer’ is type-probabilistic. Controlled experiments detect causal
relations in proportion to type probabilities. Causal inference from statistics is also
on the basis of type probabilities—tracking, say, the correlation between the placing
16 Indeed, turning this around, Amit Pundik has suggested to me that the real mystery in legal practice is
rather why anything other than ex ante probability is considered relevant to determining liability. In
particular, often legal weight is put not just on the level of risk but also on whether that risk is actually
instantiated. For example, drink-driving and having an accident is generally more punished than drink-
driving and not having one. This is so even when the ex ante probability of the drunkenness causing an
accident was equal in the two cases, indeed even if the ex ante probability in the accident case was
actually lower. The account of this paper now offers the beginnings of an explanation for this—namely,
that our causal judgment naturally seizes on ex post outcomes. When apportioning legal responsibility, it
seems there is a mixture of ‘reasonable’ moral consideration of ex ante chances, plus causal consideration
only of ex post outcomes. Hence some legal weight ends up being put on those ex post outcomes,
regardless of how ‘unfair’ it may seem to do so. (Perhaps this point may also shed light on issues
surrounding moral luck more generally.)
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of atoms in bomb devices and subsequent bomb explosions, we would find that the
latter followed the former half the time on average.
Thus ex ante probabilities, through their connection to type probabilities, are
clearly ubiquitously useful. Nothing in this paper should be taken as disputing that.
But, recall, our account of token causal judgment seemed to leave no role for ex ante
probability at all. So just what, on our account, is its role? To answer that, it is
instructive to compare Examples Two and Three from earlier, and in particular to
compare their treatments of the ex post counterfactual ppost c eð Þ.
First, in Two Bullets (Example Three), ppost c eð Þ corresponded to the probability
that the first bullet would hit the vase given that the second had not been fired. What
we needed to know, on our scheme, was this probability’s ex post value. In other
words, would the first bullet have hit the vase if the second hadn’t been fired, yes or
no? As it happened, our judgment had sufficient information to assess this with
certainty. In particular, the crucial fact was that in actuality the first bullet did hit the
vase—independently of the second having been fired.
Second, contrast this with Golf Ball (Example Two). There, ppost c eð Þ corre-
sponded to the probability that the ball would have gone into the hole had the golfer
hit it squarely. It was stipulated that this probability, understood in the ex ante or
type sense, is 0.05. But what is its ex post value? That is, would the ball have gone
into the hole had the golfer hit it squarely, yes or no? Unfortunately though, in the
actual world the ball was not hit squarely, so this squarely-hit chip shot never
existed, and we have no way of saying with confidence whether it would have gone
into the hole or not. Therefore, unlike in Two Bullets, our judgment is unable to ‘fill
in’ an ex post probability and so was forced instead to take its best guess at it—
which will, depending on the details of the case, often be the ex ante one.
What is the lesson of these two examples? My answer: that our causal judgment
fills in an ex post value for the relevant probabilities whenever it can. It only resorts
to its best guess, and hence to one not valued at 0 or 1, when it has insufficient
information to fill in an ex post value. That is the salient difference between the two
examples—in Two Bullets we feel we do have sufficient information to evaluate the
counterfactual ex post probability, but in Golf Ball we do not. In other words, the
binding constraint is epistemic. On this paper’s account, this is the only route by
which ex ante probabilities get to make any appearance at all in our causal
judgments. In particular, we (sometimes) resort to them only when the relevant ex
post probability is unknown. As far as our causal judgment is concerned, ex ante
probabilities are merely instances of epistemic probabilities.
This makes it clear how even a determinist may nonetheless often assign causal
responsibility probabilistically. For example, suppose we ask whether smoking was
responsible for a particular smoker’s lung cancer. The answer will depend on our
evaluation of the relevant ex post counterfactual, namely—would the cancer have
occurred without the smoking, yes or no? Without knowledge of the detailed physical
history of the inside of the smoker’s lung, we can only make our probabilistic best
guess given relevant causal knowledge and statistical data. (As explained in Sect. 3,
this best guess will often but not always be the ex ante probability.) Thus, even while
believing that in reality the smoking either did or didn’t cause the cancer, epistemic
constraint leads us to apportion the responsibility only probabilistically.
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For its part, meanwhile, a type probability here can be glossed as us being unsure
of which token case applies. In particular, invocation of a type probability in a token
case can always be viewed as a symptom of some epistemic constraint. By contrast,
in type cases the invocation of ex ante rather than ex post probabilities is normal.
Overall, we go ex ante in both type and epistemic cases because these two are the
same kinds of case in the eyes of our deterministically inclined causal judgment.
Causation itself is taken by us to be bivalent—something is either a cause or it
isn’t. Non-trivial probabilities only crop up in type cases and some token cases, each
time the source of the uncertainty being epistemic. These probabilities are epistemic
in the traditional subjectivist sense of Laplace, i.e. they are just a means of
representing our uncertainty concerning what we take to be in actuality a
determinate fact of the matter. Thus any probabilistic causal claim is best glossed as
elliptical either for an average over a particular population of token cases, or else for
uncertainty regarding which token case applies. ‘Smoking causes cancer’, for
instance, should thus be seen as shorthand for ‘smoking sometimes causes cancer.’17
7 Ex post counterfactuals
How do we evaluate ex post counterfactuals such as ppost c eð Þ, central to our account
throughout? Consider Two Bullets (Example Three): there, for e = the vase
shatters, and c = the second bullet fires, we wanted to know whether e would still
occur even if c did not. Intuitively, our reasoning seemed to be that since in actuality
the vase was shattered by the first bullet, and since the first bullet’s flight was
independent of the second’s, so that shattering is deemed still to happen in the
nearest possible world in which the second bullet is not fired. Formally, the nearest
*c&e-world is deemed closer than any *c&*e-world. That is, the similarity
relation between worlds must endorse the closeness of a possible world in which the
vase still shatters even though that shattering occurred after the ‘miracle’ of the
second bullet not firing, and even though ex ante the shattering was chancy. This is
just the direct analogue of ex post probabilities in the actual world, which likewise
assume the occurrence of some post-c events that are ex ante chancy.18
17 The general relation between type and token causal claims is a deep issue (Hitchcock 1995; Eells 1991),
which I do not cover fully here. Paradoxes in the literature on probabilistic causality often turn on a mismatch
between type probabilities and actual token outcomes, e.g. an effect occurring in an unlikely way as in Golf
Ball. This has prompted the suggestion that type and token causation are two entirely distinct things, and that
a simple probability-raising criterion is appropriate only to the type case (Sober 1985; Eells 1991). But, in
common with most of the literature, I do not support this suggestion. First, I think it is possible to understand
the two in a unified scheme, as this paper explains. Second, other kinds of problem for a probability-raising
account, e.g. overdetermination cases, arise in both type and token contexts alike.
18 On this point, as well as on others, the account here differs from those few previous ones that have
sought to analyze probabilistic causation in a deterministic way (Barker 2004; Ramachandran 1997—
although Ramachandran has since endorsed a different view). Those other accounts invoke a form of
deterministic counterfactual dependence, but not with the counterfactuals being evaluated in the ex post
way just described.
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In particular, this example suggests that when assessing the nearest possible
*c-world, we hold fixed all events that are not causally downstream of c, regardless
of whether those events are themselves ex ante chancy.19 In this case, that means
holding fixed that the first bullet hits the vase, since it is stipulated that the first
bullet’s fate is not causally influenced by the second’s. By modus tollens, perhaps
the best argument for this way of evaluating counterfactuals is precisely our initial
judgment that the second bullet was not the cause of the vase’s shattering—for if,
contrary to our theory, we could have thrown the vase’s shattering into question by
not firing the second bullet, then I think we would deem its actual firing a (possible)
cause of the shattering after all.
Of course, the above raises the issue of circularity. We are using these
counterfactuals to explicate the notion of causation, and yet now explicit reference
to a causal notion is made when evaluating them. It follows that formula [EP]
therefore cannot be a reductive definition. But it currently seems dubious that any
reductive semantics for causal counterfactuals is available anyway (Woodward
2003; Schaffer 2004). [Cartwright (1979) and Eells (1991) argue against any
reduction of causation to probabilities; Kvart (1986) argues against a non-causal
analysis of counterfactuals, but maintains a reductive probabilistic theory of
causation.] Further, once we are willing to evaluate such counterfactuals non-
reductively, one attractive alternative that thereby becomes available is to evaluate
them via explicit causal models instead (Pearl 2000; Spirtes et al. 2000). Arguably,
this technique offers many advantages in clarity over the alternative of Lewis-style
nomological comparisons of similarity (Woodward 2003, pp. 133–145).
Returning to the Two Bullets example for illustration, the causal model of that








19 This approach to evaluating indeterministic counterfactuals is endorsed widely, for instance by
Edgington (2004) and Schaffer (2004). [Although see Maudlin (2007) for an opposing view.] An example
of Edgington’s (due originally to David Johnson) captures the essential point—suppose I am watching a
distant indeterministic lottery on television, and a relative of mine is drawn to be the winner. Now
consider, what if while watching the draw I had scratched my nose? We have a strong intuition that this
scratching would have made no difference to the draw’s outcome, precisely for the reason that the draw
could not have been affected causally by it. But consider how our intuition changes if the counterfactual
scenario is instead that the lottery wheel was spun in a different way. Now of course it seems much more
questionable whether the outcome of the draw would have remained the same, precisely because the
draw’s outcome would now indeed have been causally downstream of the counterfactual’s antecedent.
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The counterfactual of the second bullet not firing can then be readily evaluated by
modeling it as an intervention on that node, canceling its input, roughly speaking,
and the impact of that intervention then traced on the graph.20
The issue here then becomes how to adapt this technique to our own ex post
approach. The clue lies in our causal judgment’s determinism. In its eyes, the true
causal model cannot be the probabilistic one of the above diagram, but rather must
correspond to one of the following four possibilities.
The actual course of events, in which the first bullet hit the vase but the second
missed, establishes to our causal judgment that it is scenario (c) that is the true one.
Once we have thus settled conclusively on which causal structure actually obtains,
we can then use that structure to evaluate the counterfactual of not firing the second
bullet. Clearly, the verdict is that the vase would still shatter, and thus ppost c eð Þ is
evaluated easily.
8 Further problem cases
A major benefit of [EP] is that it also sheds new light on several other important
issues and problem cases in the literature.
8.1 Contrast classes
Recall Example Two: a golfer slices her chip shot way to the right (c), but by good
fortune her ball hits a tree and deflects directly into the hole (e). c causes e, yet as we
saw earlier, pantec eð Þ  pante c eð Þ ¼ 0:001  0:05\0:
Scenario (a) Scenario (b)

























20 Note that therefore the circularity involved here is not vicious (Woodward 2003). In particular, the
assumed causal notion of an intervention invokes the causal relation between an exogenous variable and
the bullet firing, and not the one between that firing and the vase shattering.
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As well as being an example of a chance-lowering cause, this also raises a further
issue. In particular, one especially interesting analysis, favored by Hitchcock (2004,
p. 405), appeals to different contrast classes. Here, in context ‘*c’ is ambiguous
between different contrast events—for instance between the golfer hitting the ball
squarely, or her swinging and missing it altogether. Given the latter choice,
plausibly pantec eð Þ will again be greater than pante c eð Þ, since pante c eð Þ is now
presumably virtually zero. Thus, Hitchcock claims, all depends on which contrast
we choose. We can accept as true both the claim that ‘the golfer’s slice caused the
hole-in-one’, and also the claim that ‘the ball landed in the cup despite the badly
sliced shot’—because ‘we can hear them … as being made relevant to different
alternatives’ (p. 405).
Although I do not think this solution is quite right, nevertheless I agree with
much of it. ‘*c’ indeed needs to be disambiguated, and different disambiguations
indeed result in different values for pante c eð Þ.21 Moreover, the above contrastive
account of Golf Ball seems to me to be entirely accurate with regard to the ex ante/
type probabilities. Thus as a matter of prediction or advice, for instance,
endorsement of slicing the ball does indeed depend critically on whether the
contrast is with hitting it squarely or with not hitting it at all.
Recall next our own previous solution to Golf Ball: ppostc eð Þ  ppost c eð Þ ¼
1  0:05 [ 0: Why should we prefer this solution to Hitchcock’s? Here are two
reasons. First, even for *c = hitting the ball squarely, still our judgment remains
clearly that c is a token cause of e—contrary to the contrastive ex ante account.
Intuitively the reason is that, however fortuitously, in this case slicing the ball meant
it going into the hole via the deflection whereas hitting the ball squarely would
probably only have left it near the hole, not in it. This is exactly the reasoning
captured by our ex post formula. Unlike in the type case, we hear no real ambiguity
regarding the token claim. Rather, I think c is endorsed as a token cause so firmly
precisely because all disambiguations of *c that are plausible in the context yield
alike some very small ppost c eð Þ or other.
Second, for *c = missing the ball altogether, the relevant increase in ex ante
probability associated with c is minuscule: on the (already generous) figures above,
from 0 to 0.001. As with earlier examples, I think our judgment endorsing c as a
token cause is rather more emphatic than that, and only the ex post approach
captures this.
8.2 Probability pooling
Sometimes, ex post probabilities may be difficult to assign because the effects of
different causal contributions are inseparable.
Example Four: Rope (due to Christopher Hitchcock). If Gene or Pat tugs on a
rope individually, the rope will break with probability 0.5. If they tug on it together,
it will break with probability 0.75. On a given occasion, they tug together and the
rope indeed breaks. Was Gene’s tug a cause of the rope breaking?




Let c = Gene’s tug, *c = Gene’s standing idly by (i.e. only Pat tugs), e = the
rope breaks. Clearly, ppostc eð Þ ¼ 1. But ppost c eð Þ is hard to evaluate due to insufficient
information—if Gene had not tugged, would the rope still have broken? Well,
maybe. Accordingly, all we feel able to say is that Gene’s tug ‘might’ have been the
cause. Our hesitant response is, on this paper’s account, a direct consequence of the
difficulty in evaluating ppost c eð Þ. Without more details about the causal processes that
underlie the rope-breaking, the counterfactual is ‘uncertain’.22
Compare now Examples Three and Four, namely Two Bullets and Rope. A
particularly telling detail is that so far as ex ante probability is concerned the
structures of the two cases are identical—and yet our reactions to them are
nevertheless very different. So there must be more things in heaven and earth,
causally, than are dreamt of in ex ante probability. Formally, the only difference
between the two cases is that whereas the effects of the two bullets are clearly
separable, those of the two rope tugs are not. As a result, the relevant ex post
counterfactual is evaluable only in Two Bullets. Our judgment tracks exactly this
difference, suggesting again that the probability to which it is sensitive is ex post,
not ex ante.
It also suggests that our judgment does not treat causation as mere contribution to
a probability ‘pool’.23 On the contrary, causal contributions are pooled only ever as
a second-best formal maneuver, when epistemic constraint forces that upon us. In
our hearts, so to speak, we are determinists and feel that no probability is ever really
involved, pooled or otherwise. Whenever it can, as in Two Bullets, our judgment
therefore always seeks to avoid pooling and instead to assign all-or-nothing
responsibility to individual causes.
8.3 When details matter
Sometimes, we may have more than one intuition about the value of ppost c eð Þ. In such
cases, as noted earlier, I think our causal judgment depends on the empirical details,
and in a way well tracked by formula [EP].
Example Five: Weed (adapted from one due originally to Nancy Cartwright). A
weed is sprayed with defoliant (c) but nonetheless survives (e). Assume that
pantec eð Þ ¼ 0:3, and pante c eð Þ ¼ 0:7. That is, ex ante, spraying the defoliant typically
reduces the weed’s chance of survival. But because, in this particular case, in fact
the weed does survive despite the spraying, so ppostc eð Þ ¼ 1: What is ppost c eð Þ? That
is, would the weed have survived if it had not been sprayed, yes or no? There seem
to be two possible answers, depending on the biochemical details.
22 Paul Noordhof (2004, p. 190) raises an objection to deterministic accounts of probabilistic causation,
namely that while they assume that pantec eð Þ is neither 0 nor 1 (due to the case being probabilistic), at the
same time they also happily assume that pante c eð Þ ¼ 0. But what justifies such an asymmetric treatment of
pantec eð Þ and pante c eð Þ? However, this perceptive criticism [aimed at Ramachandran (1997) and Barker
(2004)] does no damage to the account in this paper. Our ex post probabilities are evaluated as 0 or 1
given c or *c alike. The only exception is for some *c cases and, as we have seen, for those there is a
ready epistemic explanation—namely, that in such cases (e.g. pooling ones like Rope) the exact value of
the counterfactual ex post probability is unknown.
23 In this respect, as in others, our account diverges from those of Lewis (1986) and Humphreys (1989).
See Hitchcock (2004) for more discussion of pooling.
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First, we might evaluate ppost c eð Þ ¼ 1; perhaps on the grounds that this weed was
revealed by its survival of the spraying therefore to be in the hardiest 30% of its
kind. Thus for sure it would also have survived if there had been no spraying. This
assumption would be justified if, for instance, knowledge of the biochemistry
showed that the action of the defoliant was causally independent of the normal risks
undergone by the weed. That is, the defoliant ‘added’ an extra 0.4 risk in addition to
the baseline 0.3 risk run by the weed anyway. Thus even if the defoliant had never
been sprayed, still our judgment holds fixed the weed’s survival of the separate 0.3
risk, since (by assumption now) that latter risk is not causally downstream of the
spraying. (In exactly the same way, in Two Bullets we held fixed the outcome of the
first bullet when assessing the counterfactual of not firing the second.) Under such
assumptions, here we get ppostc eð Þ  ppost c eð Þ ¼ 1  1 ¼ 0: So the spraying is not
endorsed as a cause of the weed’s survival, just as the gunman’s second bullet was
not endorsed as a cause of the vase shattering.
The second possibility is that we instead evaluate the ex post ppost c eð Þ to be the ex
ante pante c eð Þ; i.e. 0.7. To illustrate the case for this alternative, suppose the
biochemical details this time are such that the action of the defoliant in some way
blocks out the weed’s normal 0.3 risk process. As it turns out, the weed survives.
But if the defoliant had never been sprayed, would it still have done so? Since we
are now assuming that the normal risk process was causally downstream of the
spraying, when evaluating the counterfactual we may no longer hold that process’s
outcome fixed. Thus we cannot rule out the possibility this time that, had the
defoliant not been sprayed, the weed would have died. Rather, as often in situations
of epistemic constraint, we are instead forced to revert back to the ex ante
probability as our best available proxy for the ex post one.24
Formally, the second case therefore yields: ppostc eð Þ  ppost c eð Þ ¼ 1  0:7 [ 0: In
words, now the spraying is endorsed as a (possible) cause of the weed’s survival. Is
this conclusion defensible? I think so. Consider what we are assuming in this
scenario: that spraying the defoliant interfered with the weed’s normal risk
processes in such a way that the weed survived. That is, spraying the defoliant in
this case definitely led the weed to live, but had we not sprayed it then the weed
might not have lived. Given those assumptions, it seems clear that the spraying
indeed left the weed better off—in this case. Intuition is no longer repelled. Of
course, for general advice we should turn instead to the type probability, which
would endorse a spray-to-kill strategy. But for this particular token case, given the
assumptions behind this particular evaluation of ppost c eð Þ, not so.25
24 No doubt other assumptions regarding the biochemical details could yield yet other values for ppost c eð Þ;
and thus corresponding variation in the causal verdicts regarding c.
25 Eells (1991, p. 290) and Hitchcock (1995, p. 269) each notes a puzzling apparent asymmetry between
Examples Two and Five, i.e. between Golf Ball and Weed. Both times, c lowers the ex ante probability of
e. Yet only in Golf Ball does intuition nonetheless endorse c as a token cause. That is, intuition endorses
the slice as a cause of the ball going into the hole, while by contrast it seems to rebel at endorsing the
spraying of defoliant as a cause of the weed’s survival. But, as explained in the text, intuition in the latter
case varies subtly with type or token context, and also with our assumptions regarding the biochemical
details and thus evaluation of ppost c eð Þ. Once these important extra matters are clarified, the asymmetry in
intuitive response melts away.
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9 Causation versus causal judgment
If the account of this paper is accepted, and if furthermore it is interpreted as a thesis
about causal judgment, then we are left with two options regarding its implications
for causation itself:
(1) Causation itself is not deterministic; it is merely that our causal judgment
mistakenly assumes so.
(2) Causation really is deterministic.
Classical Humean projectivists, who presumably identify causation with causal
judgment, are thereby committed to option 2—and thus now to the view that
probabilistic causation does not exist, properly speaking, rather only epistemic
uncertainty. Other metaphysical positions, by contrast, are free to countenance the
separation of causation and causal judgment posited by option 1. In itself, this
paper’s formalism is compatible with either metaphysical choice, but in the
remainder I shall focus on option 1. One motivation is that, as we shall see in a
moment, this yields us a new defense of causation as ex ante probability-raising.
I take it that ultimately the project here is metaphysical, i.e. a concern with
causation’s place in the structure of the world. The way that philosophers have
typically investigated this is via perusal of thought-examples; yet the data, so to
speak, yielded by such perusals can only be particular causal judgments. To treat
those judgments uncritically as true metaphysical guides is to assume that they
track, always and everywhere, causation itself. It might be argued that we have no
choice but to assume that—after all, the thought runs, how else could we proceed?
But this paper’s account suggests, on the contrary, that sometimes we may have
good reason to expect our causal judgment to diverge radically from causation itself.
In particular, if humans are indeed natural determinists, then in certain probabilistic
cases this psychological bias will lead to predictable distortions. That in turn gives
us the license, indeed obligation, to treat our judgments in such cases critically. (By
way of analogy, our well-founded understanding of the human visual system
licenses us, indeed obliges us, to disregard certain optical perceptions as explicable
illusions.)
A novel method for defending the ex ante probability-raising criterion of
causation thereby becomes available. In particular, apparently damning counterex-
amples (or rather our judgments in them) can now be disregarded as mere artifacts
of a naively determinist causal psychology. Of course, not just any explaining-away
of counterexamples is legitimate; such maneuvers must also be constrained in a
principled manner. That is why it is necessary to state the psychological theory
precisely, as per [EP]. Further, the underlying psychological hypothesis should be
independently plausible. That is why it is significant that the pattern of ex post
causal judgment represented in [EP] can be seen as a natural consequence of a
determinist attitude, since our having that attitude in turn carries independent
plausibility (Sect. 3).
Any such psychological hypothesis is of course ultimately an empirical one. We
thus open a welcome new route for empirical input into metaphysical inquiry. Much
‘experimental philosophy’ so far has tested whether certain intuitions claimed to be
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widespread are indeed so, or has tracked what factors those intuitions are sensitive
to. That is different from what I am proposing here, which is that findings from
psychology can license us to disregard certain intuitions altogether. Empirical
evidence thus bears directly on inquiry into the underlying metaphysics, not just
psychology. A priori discussion can be—and ought to be—augmented in a
principled way.
The only empirical evidence that this paper provides is informal, namely our
intuitive reactions to certain thought-examples. What does the extensive causal
psychology literature say on the matter? To my knowledge, as yet nothing
directly—let us see why. At issue is whether we judge causation probabilistically ex
ante or deterministically ex post. It might be thought that decisive results do exist
already and that they tell against this paper’s position. There is ample experimental
evidence that even infants, for instance, naturally interpret causation probabilisti-
cally. But care must be taken when assessing such evidence’s implications. In
particular, what has actually been shown is that infants can infer causal relations
from probabilistic data—and that is quite consistent with the view of this paper. For
instance, in Example One we might infer the probabilistic causal relation that half
the time placing the atom in the box causes the bomb to explode. But as explained
earlier (Sect. 6), such a type-inference is readily compatible with our account. The
understandable overall emphasis in the cognitive psychology literature on type-level
causal learning means that its empirical results are not decisive with regard to our
particular debate. Moreover, even in token cases, assigning retrospective causal
responsibility probabilistically is similarly not decisive, so long as examples of such
a practice can be explained each time as an instance of epistemic constraint forcing
us to evaluate the relevant ex post counterfactual via a probabilistic best guess.
Generally, precisely because our account is consistent with the ubiquity of
probabilistic causal judgment, therefore one has to work hard to engineer critical
cases where the judgments predicted by this paper’s thesis actually do diverge from
those predicted by a standard probabilistic view. But, notice, we have already
encountered a number of just such cases—they are precisely those discussed in
Sects. 4, 5 and 8. And our judgments there tracked the ex post formula [EP], not
standard ex ante probability-raising. In lieu of future empirical investigation, those
judgments are therefore important prima facie evidence in our account’s favor.
To sum up: the account of causal metaphysics as ex ante probability-raising can
be saved from particular counterexamples by conjoining it with an account of our
causal psychology as determinist. Empirical evidence regarding the latter can thus
serve to save (or undermine) the former. As mentioned in Sect. 1, such a salvation is
desirable for independent reasons; a new path to it is therefore good news.
Methodologically, I have assumed that our access to causation is through the
filter of our causal judgment. Therefore any account of causation must implicitly be
a composite account of both our judgment and what we are judging, i.e. of both
psychology and metaphysics. It seems dubious to suppose we can know a priori any
particular causal judgment to be infallible. Thus we need instead to formulate
different metaphysics/psychology packages, and then to test each package as a
whole against the ‘data’ of our experience of the world, including especially our
causal judgments (understood broadly to include also their implicit reflection in the
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practice of science). This paper’s is just one possible such package. Of course, there
may be others that fit the data too. But a package that seems clearly not to, is the one
that conjoins ex ante probability-raising with the simple psychology that all causal
judgments are veridical. Thus the necessity of adjusting the second component in
order to save the first.
Finally, it must be conceded squarely, there remains one important class of cases
in which this paper’s formal account does still falter, namely cases of causal
overdetermination (including pre-emption). That is, in psychologistic terms, the
particular psychological hypothesis that we are natural determinists does not explain
away the discrepancy between a token counterfactual account of probability-raising
(such as ours) on one hand, and our causal judgments in overdetermination cases on
the other. In this respect, [EP] exhibits the usual vulnerability of a simple
counterfactual account. Perhaps this paper sheds new light even on this well known
challenge though, albeit only indirectly. In particular, I believe that the same general
methodological strategy introduced here, applying psychology to metaphysics, may
prove effective in overdetermination cases too. But demonstration of that will have
to wait for another day.
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